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I
INTRODUCTION
Markets arise in unexpected places. Take, for example, the case of kidney donation.
Although the common conception of kidney donation is one of gift exchange, modern kidney
donation is better characterized as a market. Kidney exchange is not, however, a commodity
market, in which price determines who gets what. Rather, kidney exchange is a matching market
in which money does not change hands and market participants care with whom they
transact—in other words, they must be matched, through either individual search or intermediary
involvement.
Given that kidney exchange is a matching market, one might also expect to observe the
widespread use of an instrument common to markets—formal contract. Although markets can
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and do flourish under all conditions, including in the absence of third-party contract enforcement,
markets in which exchange requires significant present investment in the expectation of future
return are more likely to emerge and persist when institutions exist to protect property and
contractual rights. Yet formal contract so far has played only a limited role in kidney exchange.
This article discusses a new development in kidney exchange, the Advanced Donation
Program (ADP), that permits a living kidney donor to donate a kidney in advance for the later
benefit of a designated beneficiary who may or may not be in renal failure at the time of the
donation. Referred to by some as a kidney “gift certificate,” “layaway plan,” or “voucher,”1
ADP builds on the matching market principles that are fundamental to modern-day kidney
exchange. But ADP, because of the advanced nature of the donations, pushes the market analogy
even further, relying—for the first time—on a present investment (in the form of a healthy
kidney) by donors who have an expectation of future return (in the form of a compatible kidney
for a friend or loved one), leaving those donors potentially vulnerable to nonperformance.

1

Enrique Rivero, ‘Gift certificate’ enables kidney donation when convenient and transplant
when needed, UCLA NEWSROOM, (July 11, 2016), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/
gift-certificate-enables-kidney-donation-when-convenient-and-transplant-when-needed.
2
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2865942

ADP also incorporates—again, for the first time in the transplant setting—the use of
formal contracts regarding those performances, by including a contractual agreement in the form
of consents to donate and receive a transplant. In another setting, the use of formal contracts
would hardly be notable, given the temporal separation of obligations. However, the transplant
community has historically viewed formal contracts in the transplant setting with hostility, and
that traditional hostility remains evident in current ADP practice.2 This article demonstrates that
the use of formal ADP contracts is likely inadvertent, and that these contracts are inadequate to
tackle the complex, nonsimultaneous exchange of kidneys in which patients donate a kidney
before their intended recipients have been matched with a potential donor. As currently
structured, therefore, ADP poses risks to both transplant centers and registries, as market makers,
and to donors, as counterparties who have made an initial investment in anticipation of future
performance.
At the big picture level, then, ADP is a useful case study offering insights on both market
and contract development. It provides an unusual window into the evolution of the exchange of a
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single good—a kidney for transplantation—from gift, to simple barter, to exchange with a
temporal separation of obligations that relies solely on trust and reputational constraints for
enforcement, to a complex matching market in which the parties rely, at least in part, on formal
contract to define and clarify their obligations to each other.
At the small picture level, this article argues that ADP is a positive development,
providing greater flexibility and the possibility of better matches for individual patients. Further,
ADP could, if it reaches the full potential envisioned by many transplant professionals, increase
the number of living kidney donors at a time of great shortage.3 In order to achieve that,
however, ADP, as a system built on a foundation of trust and selflessness, cannot sustain too
many instances of miscommunication and false hope. This article therefore offers some
preliminary suggestions to improve ADP so as to maximize its potential to increase transplants,
while also protecting donors, recipients, registries, and kidney swaps and chains more generally.
Part II analyzes kidney exchange as a matching market, tracing the development of
kidney donation from a gift model, in the case of deceased kidney donation; to barter, in the case
3

Rivero, supra note 1 (noting that the program could increase altruistic donations by removing
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of simultaneous kidney exchange; to exchange characterized by the temporal separation of
counterparty obligations, in the case of Non-simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor (NEAD)
chains; culminating in ADP. Part III discusses the role of contracts in various types of markets,
highlighting the notable absence of formal contract in kidney exchange, even as that exchange
has matured from a relatively simple system of simultaneous barter to a more complex system of
intertemporal exchange. It also discusses the traditional hostility of the transplant community to
formal contracts, arguing that ADP presents a rare opportunity for contract expansion in the
kidney exchange setting. Part IV details specific mechanisms for improving ADP. Part V
concludes.
II
KIDNEY EXCHANGE AS A MATCHING MARKET
A. Commodity Markets Versus Matching Markets
A market is a mechanism by which goods or services are exchanged. Often, money is
paid in exchange for such goods and services. Despite the important role money plays in markets,
however, it is not the essence of a market. As stated by Nobel Laureate Alvin E. Roth: “[u]ntil
recently, economists often passed quickly over matching and focused primarily on commodity
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markets, in which price alone determines who gets what . . . The price does all the work,
bringing the two of you together at the price at which supply equals demand.”4
So what is a matching market, and how is it different from a commodity market? In some
markets, the goods and services being exchanged are indivisible and heterogeneous, which often
leads to thin markets, in that it is harder to find the right exchange counterparty.5 For example,
in a stock exchange, the buyer of a stock does not necessarily care from whom she is buying the
stock, but if she is looking for an apartment, not just any apartment will do. In the apartment
case, market participants must be appropriately matched, either through a centralized matching
mechanism or through individual search efforts, before trading can commence.6
Some well-known matching markets, developed using the principles of game theory and
market design, include school admission systems (such as the centralized matching systems in
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New York City and Boston)7 and the National Resident Matching Program, by which all
medical students get their first jobs as residents.8 Although money is used in these markets (for
example, the application fees for school admission and the salary and bonuses in job hunting), it
does not by itself determine who gets what. This is in contrast to a commodity market, such as a
stock exchange, in which price alone determines who gets what.
B. The Human Organ Matching Market
Because buying or selling a human organ for transplantation is illegal in the United
States,9 price plays no role in kidney allocation even though a compatible donor kidney is a
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valuable resource. Thus, even though a market in which human organs are bought and sold might
mitigate the mismatch between kidney demand and supply, human organ allocation is a matching
market.10 As detailed in the remainder of this section, the market for matching donors and
recipients works differently for the allocation of deceased donor kidneys than it does for living
donor kidneys.
1. Deceased Donor Kidneys
In the case of deceased donor kidneys, a kidney failure patient registers with the United
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), which is responsible for maintaining the waiting list and
matching registered deceased donor kidneys to patients on the waiting list.12 In doing so, UNOS
serves as the market maker—deciding who gets what and when based on carefully defined
criteria.
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Today, more than 120,000 patients await kidney transplants.13 The waiting time for a
patient on the deceased donation list ranges from a few months to more than a decade.14 An
individual’s priority for transplantation depends on a variety of criteria, as determined by policies
of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN).15 Those criteria include: the
patient’s tissue and blood type, time spent on the waiting list, the difficulty of matching the
patient, and Estimated Post Transplant Survival.16 To be matched, the patient requires an
immunologically compatible donor, as determined by the blood types and recipient antibodies
against the human leukocyte antigens (HLA) of the donor.17
2. Living Donor Kidneys
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An appealing alternative to waiting for a kidney donation from a deceased donor is to
find a healthy living donor. Most commonly, patients receiving a living donor kidney do not go
through UNOS.18 Instead, patients and their potential donors present themselves to transplant
centers, which then serve as the market maker that facilitates the donation.19 Because living
donor transplantation is also subject to immunological compatibility constraints, many willing
donors are incompatible with their prospective recipient—typically a loved one.20
As a response to this challenge, economists and medical professionals developed Kidney
Paired Donation (KPD) as a way to facilitate swaps between incompatible donor−patient pairs so
that they can still have access to living kidney donation.21 Incompatible living donor−patient
pairs swap with other pairs so that the donors who cannot donate to their intended recipients can
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donate to a different recipient in the exchange pool.22 In turn, her original intended recipient will
receive a kidney from another donor, whose intended recipient is also receiving a transplant.23 A
simple exchange between two pairs is illustrated in Figure 1. To facilitate these exchanges, KPD
registries manage pools of potential donors and their intended recipients and use matching
algorithms to find immunologically compatible exchange opportunities.24
The matching algorithms are typically designed to maximize the number of patients
matched to compatible donors and to minimize differences in waiting times among patients.25
To that end, the KPD registries assign greater priority to hard-to-match donor−patient pairs,
whose waiting time can otherwise be dramatically longer. This might also increase the number of
transplants facilitated by the matching system, if done right.26 These matching algorithms have
been evolving, just as the matching policies adopted by the UNOS national program for
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traditional deceased donation are evolving. For example, some registries have given increasing
priority to patients that are immunologically difficult to match.27

A

B

C

D

Figure 1. Illustration of an exchange between two incompatible donor-patient pairs (A−B, and
C−D): A intended to donate to B, C intended to donate to D, but unfortunately neither of them
are compatible (indicated by the red cross); noticing that A is compatible with D, and C is
compatible with B, the transplant center arranges a two-way exchange between the two pairs, in
which both B and D receive a kidney transplant.
Algorithm matching is only part of the challenge of paired donation, however. Because
prospective donors can back out of a planned transplant, KPD leads to a potential reneging
problem in which a donor has already donated her kidney as part of a planned exchange, but the
26
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donor originally matched with her intended recipient backs out of the transplant. Such donor
reneging is rare, but not unheard of.28 As a result, KPD practice initially favored simultaneous
surgeries for all involved in the exchange, to avoid the possibility of donor reneging.29
An important innovation in KPD was the development of NEAD chains. These chains are
initiated by a non-directed donor, who donates a kidney to a patient with an incompatible
potential donor without expectation that a loved one receive a kidney in return, as illustrated by
Figure 2.30 The incompatible donor can then donate to another incompatible pair, continuing the
chain. Most often, the final donor of a chain donates a kidney to a patient on the kidney waitlist.
The structure of NEAD chains removes the need for simultaneity, enabling patients to receive a
kidney transplant before their paired donor donates, adding flexibility to KPD practice and
permitting more transplants. If there is a significant time gap between a recipient’s transplant and
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her paired donor’s donation, the donor is referred to as a bridge donor.31 Theoretically, the
longer the time between the recipient’s transplantation and the bridge donor’s donation, the
greater the risk that the bridge donor will renege on her promise to donate a kidney to the next
recipient in the chain.

Figure 2. An illustration of a KPD chain. The non-directed donor donates to an Intended Donor
(ID) within a donor-patient pair, and then her original ID donates to the ID of the second pair, so
on and so forth. Hence the donation of a non-directed donor can trigger a chain of transplants.
If one of the potential donors in the chain does not honor her promise to donate, no direct
and specific harm is done to any specific individual participant, because no donor has donated
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without her intended recipient receiving a transplant.32 However, the NEAD chain will not reach
its full length, and potential transplants will not be performed. Moreover, as with any
bargained-for exchange, if reneging were to become too common, confidence in the NEAD
system could become compromised.
Although UNOS was initially reluctant to participate in these living donor kidney
exchanges, several non-profit registries have developed to match donors and patients and to
facilitate transplants. The National Kidney Registry (NKR), established in 2008, has been the
most successful registry, having facilitated nearly 2000 living donor transplants as of April 14,
2016.33 Part of NKR’s success can be attributed to its innovative approaches to overcoming
logistical obstacles.34
3. The Advanced Donation Program
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Liu et al., supra note 28.
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Transplantation: A Novel Concept, 9 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2180, 2181–84 (2009)
(describing the first asynchronous, out-of-sequence transplant chain, which enabled more people
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As noted in the previous section, donor reneging in NEAD chains may impede their
efficiency by preventing them from reaching their full potential, but it does not harm any
particular participant directly. A new KPD arrangement, the Advanced Donation Program (ADP),
however, does present a danger of harming specific individual participants. Although ADP is
still in its infancy, it is already being offered by at least nine transplant centers throughout the
United States under the umbrella of NKR.35
Recall that the intended recipient in a NEAD chain is transplanted before or
simultaneously with her paired donor’s donation, reducing the possibility that the pair gives a
kidney without receiving one in return. In practice, however, donors often have their own time
constraints that interfere with this ideal. For example, patients or donors may have rigid time
constraints, due to employment or other commitments, such that enforcing the convention of
each patient receiving a transplant no later than the donor’s donation prevents them from
participating in KPD.36 In response, NKR implemented ADP. In ADP, when a donor has a
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compatible recipient in the KPD database and her intended recipient cannot be presently matched,
the donor can choose to donate in advance.37 This advanced donation entitles the intended
recipient to a “prioritized opportunity to receive a kidney as part of a swap within the NKR,” but
does not guarantee that her intended recipient will receive a transplant from the exchange
anytime soon, if ever.38 In contrast to the scenario in which a bridge donor may renege in
standard NEAD chains, the risk in ADP is that NKR is unable to provide a compatible kidney to
the intended recipient. Both the donor and recipient participating in ADP explicitly acknowledge
this possibility in separate consent forms, attached hereto as Appendix A & B.39
A Canadian case very similar to ADP serves as evidence that the risk of a patient
experiencing a long waiting time or not receiving a kidney transplant is not merely hypothetical.
Estella Jamieson and her son-in-law, Jeff Pike, participated in the Living Kidney Donor Paired
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Exchange Program in Canada after Jeff developed renal failure and needed a kidney transplant.40
Before the day of the surgeries, Jeff developed shingles and became unfit for the transplant
procedure, so his transplant surgery was cancelled.41 Based on the promise that Jeff would
receive top priority if she went through with her donation as scheduled, Estella decided to
proceed.42 Yet months later, and long after Jeff’s health allowed him to go through surgery, Jeff
was still not transplanted and the pair, reportedly unable to get a satisfactory explanation from
the exchange program, aired their complaints publicly.43 Part IV revisits this case and argues
that the current structure of ADP does not adequately handle such contingencies and risks.
III
CONTRACTS AND MARKETS
So far, parts I and II have described matching markets, as distinct from commodity
markets, and have detailed the ways in which kidney donation constitutes a matching market. An
important aspect of markets—whether commodity or matching—is the element of contract.
40

See Rosa Marchitelli, Organ exchange program slow to deliver on promise to man in need of
a kidney, family says, CBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2015, last updated 6:07 AM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/kidney-exchange-chain-breakdown-1.3263749; see also LIVING
DONOR PAIRED EXCHANGE REGISTRY,
https://www.blood.ca/sites/default/files/english_ldpe_brochure_general.pdf (outlining the details
of the Living Donor Exchange Registry).
41
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Though markets can exist even in the absence of enforceable contract rights—indeed, black
markets often persist even in the face of legal bans on the market—exchange that requires
significant present investment in the expectation of future return is facilitated by a legal regime
of contract and such markets are less common and less robust in regimes lacking institutions that
protect property and contract rights.44 This part discusses the role of formal contract (or, more
accurately, its notable absence) in kidney exchange arguing that, as kidney exchange has become
more complex, with performances and obligations extending across time, the possibilities for
contract have similarly grown and may be underutilized.
At the same time, there are substantial barriers to the expansion of contract as a response
to the risk of nonperformance in kidney exchange. As will be shown, contracts are currently
employed only reluctantly—indeed, most likely, inadvertently—and contain few firm
commitments or obligations. Moreover, transplant professionals have traditionally been
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See, e.g., Douglas C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 97, 101 (1991) (explaining how
institutions help structure of the economy and thus influence the direction of economic change);
See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (explaining how
third party enforcement of contracts facilitates the emergence of sophisticated capital markets).
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suspicious of contracts in kidney exchange and are distrustful of inviting lawyers and the legal
system into the doctor−patient relationship.46
Despite this, ADP may present a rare opportunity for an expansion of the use of contract
in the kidney exchange setting. Accordingly, part IV suggests a variety of contractual and
noncontractual mechanisms to protect patients and the integrity of ADP. Those suggestions
include a more careful and detailed disclosure of the risk that a kidney may not be found for the
intended recipient or may be found only after great delay, as well as greater transparency
regarding priorities and algorithms.
A. Simultaneous Versus Intertemporal Exchange
The recognition that kidney exchange is a matching market carries important implications
for the instruments of market design. As previously noted, kidney exchange began as KPD, a
relatively straightforward, simultaneous, barter-type exchange. As with all simultaneous
exchange, formal contract plays only a limited role in traditional KPD. This is because contract
law is primarily about enforcing promises. When exchange is simultaneous there is thus little
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See infra notes XX and accompanying text (discussing this in more detail).
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need for contract law, and other legal mechanisms, such as tort and criminal law, are usually
sufficient to address the parties’ needs.47 Perhaps not surprisingly then, formal contracts are not
seen among traditional KPD donors, intended recipients, and market makers (the individual
coordinating transplant centers).
Rather, contract law is primarily concerned with an exchange of goods or services that
extends through time.48 Such intertemporal exchange requires one or more parties to rely on and
adhere to promises of future performance, and contract is the usual mechanism by which the law
ensures that those promises are kept.49
In contrast to traditional KPD, NEAD chains possess this element of intertemporal
exchange and, as a result, donor reneging is a known risk in NEAD chains.50 One thus might
expect contracts to play an important role in NEAD chain organization. However, significant
enforcement hurdles inhibit the use of formal contracts to address the risk of donor reneging that

47

See ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 18–19 (2011) (explaining why parties
enter into contracts).
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See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (discussing NEAD chains and donor reneging
risk).

50
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arises from non-simultaneous performance in NEAD chains.51 Moreover, a contract purporting
to require a reluctant donor to nonetheless part with her kidney is perceived as contrary to the
ethical mandate that organ donation should be the purely voluntary act of a willing and informed
donor.52 This would even be the case when a potential NEAD chain donor has procured a
matching kidney for her paired recipient by promising to donate her kidney as part of the chain
and then fails to do so.53
As a result, the concept of contract lurks in the background of NEAD chain organization,
without ever materializing. Patients inquire whether they will be required to sign a contract and
are assured that they will not. Transplant professionals consider the possibility of formal contract,
only to dismiss it as overly legalistic or detrimental to the doctor−patient relationship.54 Others
simply assume that the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)55 renders NEAD chain contracts
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Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Custom, Contract, and Kidney Exchange, 62 DUKE L.
J. 645, 663–67 (2012).
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Id. at 663.
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National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2012).
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illegal.56 In the end, therefore, it is moral commitment, social solidarity, and the screening
practices of transplant professionals that control NEAD chain bridge-donor reneging—not the
use of formal contracts.57
B. ADP And Contract
ADP participants sign separate consent forms in which the donor agrees to donate her
kidney in exchange for her intended recipient’s (IR) “prioritized opportunity to receive a kidney
as part of a swap.”58 This raises two preliminary questions: first, does this consent form a
contract? And second, if so, what is it a contract for?
The first question can be answered in the affirmative. The consent form is an example of
the type of low-powered enforcement contract common in many relationships that rely primarily
on trust and informal sanctions, rather than primarily on formal contract enforcement, to ensure
performance. As for the second question, consistent with the case law and literature on
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Healy & Krawiec, supra note 49 at 662. (suggesting that contract law does not necessarily
conflict with NOTA’s prohibition of purchasing organs).
57
Id. at 649.
58
NATIONAL KIDNEY REGISTRY,
https://www.kidneyregistry.org/docs/adp_consent_form_intended_donor.pdf; NATIONAL KIDNEY
REGISTRY, https://www.kidneyregistry.org/docs/adp_consent_form_intended_recipient.pdf; See
infra Appendices A and B. Although NKR drafted the ADP consents, they are administered by
transplant professionals at individual transplant centers.
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low-powered enforcement, the contract likely protects only against bad faith behavior on the part
of NKR—for example, a complete failure to provide the IR with any priority.
1. ADP And Low-Powered Enforcement
Although the ADP consent forms promise the IR a “prioritized opportunity,” that phrase
is not defined, and the forms explicitly provide that there is no guarantee that the IR will receive
a kidney.59 At some level, this imprecision makes sense. The ease with which any IR can be
matched may vary dramatically across patients and through time, depending on the IR blood type,
degree of immunological compatibility with the general population, and age.60 Moreover, any
number of unforeseen events could prevent a match to the IR or render matching more difficult
than assumed at the time of contracting.61 Those unforeseen events could be recipient-dependent,
that is, something could occur that makes it difficult to match the IR. For example, an IR might
become too ill to receive a transplant or be too difficult to match because of immunologic
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exchange).
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obstacles. These immunological obstacles can change over time, and by their nature, registries
such as NKR have greater numbers of difficult-to-match patients.62 The unforeseen events that
prevent matching could also be registry dependent, meaning that something could occur that
renders NKR incapable of matching patients with donors. For example, NKR might dissolve, or
a national program could take over the entire KPD process.
There are generally three possible approaches a court might take when presented with the
type of contractual imprecision posed by the promise of “a priorititzed opportunity” in ADP: (1)
conclude that the promise is too indefinite to form a legally binding obligation, (2) conclude that
a contract is formed, but that it is breached only through bad faith behavior, such as a complete
failure to attempt to provide priority to the IR, or (3) conclude that a contract is formed and apply
“high powered enforcement,” by attempting to divine the parties’ intent and gap filling the
meaning of “prioritized opportunity.”63

62

Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth, New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange. American
Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2012, 102(3): 354–359. (discussing how some
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Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert F. Scott, Braiding: The Interactions of Formal
And Informal Contracting In Theory, Practice, And Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1418
(2010) (discussing the options available to the court in Eli Lilly v. Emisphere, 408 F. Supp. 2d
668 (S.D. Ind. 2006)).
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For both doctrinal and policy reasons, we believe that option two—finding a contract that
can be breached only by bad faith—is both the proper and most likely outcome. The level of
imprecision employed in ADP is not uncommon in instances where uncertainty about future
outcomes makes specifying possible future states—and the obligations of the parties in each of
those future states—impractical. Nonetheless, NKR has made a promise to the donor—one on
which the donor has relied, to her detriment.
In such cases, courts have sometimes applied what has been referred to as “low-powered
enforcement.65” Low--powered enforcement imposes sanctions for “red-faced” violations of the
agreement to provide a prioritized opportunity, but does not impose sanctions for a failure to
reach particular outcomes.66 In other words, in the unlikely event that NKR were to make no
attempt to match the IR with a compatible recipient on a prioritized basis then a court could
conclude that NKR violated its promise to provide the IR with a prioritized opportunity. But a
court would not, in a low-powered enforcement environment, attempt to direct any particular
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Id. at 1427.
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Id. at 1417.
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resolution—by, for example, concluding that the IR should have been transplanted with any
particular kidney.
For a number of reasons, it seems unlikely that a court would conclude that NKR has
made no enforceable promise whatsoever to the donor (option one). The donor has relinquished
an important and valuable item—a healthy kidney—and undertaken some health risk and
physical discomfort. Further, she has suffered lost time and inconvenience, all in expectation of a
future return—the possibility of a matching donor for her IR. In addition, NKR is the contract
drafter, a repeat player, and the more experienced and informed party. As such, any ambiguity in
the contract terms would traditionally be construed against NKR.67
At the same time, any attempt by courts to gap fill the contract by finding a specific
obligation on the part of NKR to deliver a transplantable kidney to the IR would be dangerous.
As already noted, a number of contingencies outside of the control of NKR could prevent any
specific match or transplant.68 Moreover, uncertainty regarding court interpretations of liability
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could impede the development of ADP and similar advanced donation programs, and could chill
future attempts at transplant innovation. Given the current kidney shortage, this is a substantial
social cost. Though this approach is unwise, it cannot be ruled out entirely. Not all courts have
exercised restraint when interpreting imprecise promises such as those contained in the ADP
consent forms,69 and this possibility poses a legal risk to NKR and potential reputational risk to
participating transplant centers and personnel, a concern to which we return in the following part
II.B.2.
2. Contract Resistance in Transplantation
As should be evident from the foregoing discussion, the contractual protections currently
contained in ADP consent forms impose few firm obligations and provide only limited
protection to donors and intended recipients. Moreover, their incompleteness carries legal risk to
NKR and potential reputational risk to ADP participating transplant centers and personnel. Given
this risk, why do ADP participants not insist on more detailed contractual language? Why is
NKR itself not incentivized to provide it?
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Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 63 at 1422–42 (criticizing cases in which courts have not
followed the low-powered enforcement approach).
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As already noted, formal contracts are largely absent from NEAD chains, despite the
known risk of donor reneging. Of course, transplantation is not the only setting in which
researchers have noted a reluctance to rely on formal contract. In his seminal study of Wisconsin
businesses, Stewart Macaulay found that “businessmen often prefer to rely on “a man’s word” in
a brief letter, a handshake, or “common honesty and decency”—even when the transaction
involves exposure to serious risks.”71 One lawyer interviewed by Macaulay as part of the project
complained that he was “sick of being told, ‘We can trust Old Max,’ when the problem is not one
of honesty but of reaching an agreement that both sides understand.”72
Many of Macaulay’s subjects viewed formal contract as a hurdle to closing a sale and
detrimental to customer relations.73 Suing a customer was, at best, a last resort and lawyers were
thought to only get in the way:
[I]f something comes up, you get the other man on the telephone and deal with
the problem. You don’t read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to
do business again. One doesn’t run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because
one must behave decently.74
71

Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
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Although the settings in which transplant professionals and Wisconsin businessmen
operate are very different, there are many similarities in their attitudes toward formal contracts
(and lawyers). One group of transplant professionals explained the issue in language notably
similar to that documented by Macaulay:
We maintain that the basic principle of organ donation is based upon selfless
generosity and faith in the human spirit, rather than contractual obligations. We would
discourage future participants from becoming mired in legal arguments and lengthy
debates that would only cause interminable delays.75
This rejection of NEAD chain contracts arose in connection with concerns over donor
reneging and, as already discussed, contracts in that setting face a variety of enforceability
hurdles and ethical concerns.76 The conclusion that other mechanisms are more suitable than
contractual remedies for controlling NEAD chain donor reneging is thus an understandable
(though not inevitable) conclusion.77
In ADP, however, it is the donor who performs first and faces the risk of nonperformance
by NKR. Many of the objections to NEAD chain contracts—which center around the possible
75
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coercive and negative public policy effects of binding donors through contractual
obligations—are not implicated by ADP, nor are the same enforceability barriers present.
Yet resistance to formal contracting remains. In fact, our conversations and experiences
with those involved with ADP suggests a resistance to even recognizing the current ADP consent
forms as containing contractual obligations. A recent exchange in the American Journal of
Transplantation introducing the concept of ADP provides just one example. The concept authors,
in discussing ADP, never acknowledge the contractual nature of the ADP consent forms, despite
our suggestion that the consents impose a contractual obligation.81 Once again, there are clear
similarities with Macaulay’s interviews, notwithstanding the time gap (1963) and different
setting (Wisconsin businesses):
Often businessmen do not feel they have ‘a contract’—rather they have ‘an
order.’ They speak of ‘cancelling the order’ rather than ‘breaching our contract.’ When I
began practice I referred to the order cancellations as breaches of contract, but my
clients objected since they do not think of cancellation as wrong . . . Lawyers are often
surprised by this attitude.82
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See Flechner et al., supra note 36 (introducing the concept of ADP); Liu, Krawiec & Melcher,
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To reiterate, there are justifiable reasons for this cautious approach toward formal
contracting in the transplant setting—a complex and malleable system with many competing
interests. Allocation strategies and prioritizations for different patients frequently are modified as
utility and fairness are balanced.83 Moreover, courts have little experience with or expertise in
transplantation, which could prompt concern about their ability to understand and evaluate these
factors when, ex post, a transplant (or, in this case, a planned transplant) has not gone as
expected.
At the same time, the traditional objections to the use of formal contracts are not present
in ADP. First, in ADP it is the registry that poses a risk of reneging, not the patient. Second,
impediments to enforcement (to the extent that they exist) appear no greater or different in kind
in ADP than in other contexts in which unforeseen events may frustrate the parties’ original
plans. Finally, there are no concerns about binding unwilling donors to commitments that they
may later regret—instead, it is NKR who is being held to its promises to the patient.
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It seems likely that the transplant community, conditioned to traditional objections to the
use of formal contractual obligations in kidney exchange, has failed to appreciate, at this early
stage of ADP development, that those objections are simply inapplicable to ADP. Moreover,
transplant professionals involved in ADP, as already noted, do not appear to recognize that the
registry is already committed through contract, but in a manner sufficiently vague as to carry
risks that a court will find obligations in the contractual language not intended by NKR.86
This lack of precision, in turn, imposes a risk on transplant centers and professionals
involved in ADP. Frustrated patients, who may not understand the risks inherent in ADP,
may—if the recipient is unable to be matched within a certain timeframe—turn to the transplant
center, surgeons, and other personnel with whom she has already communicated and who
performed the IR’s transplant, rather than seeking out the transplant registry, with whom she has
had no prior direct dealings. If so, then any misunderstandings among patients about the risk that
an IR will not receive a transplant under ADP and the obligations owed to her by NKR carry the
possibility of reputational damage to individual transplant centers and professionals. Accordingly,
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it is in the interests of patients, NKR, and participating transplant centers to seek more clarity in
the ADP contract and to develop more detailed, standardized disclosures apprising patients of the
risks inherent in ADP.
As Macaulay noted so many years ago, the law is not the only—or even, necessarily, the
most important—mechanism constraining the behavior of parties to exchange.87 Among
Wisconsin businessmen, other considerations, including the reputational constraints on repeat
players and an overriding norm that “one does not welsh on a deal” helped to ensure that defaults
remained relatively rare events.88 Despite the similarities already noted between that setting and
the transplant setting, there are also differences that suggest a more careful consideration of the
benefits of formal contract in ADP is warranted. Like the Wisconsin businessmen studied by
Macaulay, NKR is a repeat player in transplantation and relies on its reputation for care and
trustworthiness in order to ensure patients, transplant centers, and the transplant community at
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large that it is a safe partner with which to transact. Thus, we do not expect NKR to undertake its
obligations to ADP patients lightly. Aside from its commitment to help transplant patients, rather
than harm them, its reputation is a valuable asset and one it seeks to protect.
Unlike the Wisconsin businessmen studied by Macaulay, however, ADP patients are not
repeat players with an understanding of industry customs and practices. They are not represented
by counsel, are highly motivated to complete the transaction, and are likely to be unsophisticated,
at least in the details of transplantation and kidney matching. In other words, unlike the
environment documented by Macaulay, in which problems are avoided without resort to formal
contractual language and legal sanctions because “usually there is little room for honest
misunderstandings or good faith differences of opinion about the nature and quality of . . .
performance,” there is quite a bit of room for ADP patients to misunderstand the risks of
advanced donation and the various contingencies that may prevent matching the IR as planned.92
In addition, Macaulay was careful to note that “when defaults occur they are not likely to be
disastrous because of techniques of risk avoidance or risk spreading.”93 Such risk mitigation

92
93

See Macaulay, supra note 71 at 62, 65–66.
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techniques are not available to ADP patients: a failure to transplant the IR as intended could be
disastrous. Thus, as part IV argues, consent forms should endeavor to clarify the priority due to
the IR as concretely as possible, more appropriately warn donors of the potential risks of
advanced donation, and provide greater transparency.

IV
MAKING ADP BETTER
Part III noted that the ADP consent forms likely constitute a contract, though one subject
to only low-powered enforcement. Moreover, as we discuss below, the priority process and other
aspects of ADP lack transparency and are not clearly disclosed to patients in the current consent
forms. Finally, the forms do not address a number of possible contingencies, leaving the door
open to future misunderstandings.
These are problems for reasons that go beyond the possible harm to a patient who has
undertaken the irreversible act of kidney donation for the future benefit of a loved one. One of
the main goals of introducing ADP was to increase participation in living kidney donation and
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help patients in need.95 And kidney exchange, as a system built on a foundation of trust and
selflessness, cannot sustain too many instances of miscommunication and false hope. It is
therefore important that participants share a common understanding about the arrangements. This
includes clarifying the variability of waiting times, the priority that the IR receives relative to
other recipients, and the actions to be taken in contingency situations. This part provides
suggestions for improvement and points out challenges and nuances involved in the practice.
The likelihood that the IR is able to receive a kidney depends on the difficulty of finding
a match within the KPD pool and the degree of prioritization that the matching algorithms give
to the IR.96 As previously detailed, the odds of matching an IR can vary dramatically and
depend primarily on her blood type and the number of antibodies she has against potential
donors. The consent forms should acknowledge this variation and perhaps even broadly quantify
it. For example, NKR could provide information on what percentage of donors currently
available in the registry match the IR. This would provide a sense of how difficult it will be to
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find a future match. In addition, NKR could summarize the amount of time IRs within ADP have
historically waited for a kidney.
This information snapshot is insufficient, however, because the probability of finding a
match changes over time based on the composition of the pool and changes in the IR’s
immunological status. Introducing certain intermediate assurances could address the changing
nature of the donor pool, build trust, and improve communication between the registries and the
participants. Therefore, data on match likelihood and waiting times should be updated
periodically. Such updating should not be an onerous burden to NKR. Currently, UNOS imposes
a similar reporting obligation on transplant centers, by requiring them to update everyone on
their deceased donor waiting list (which is currently much larger than the ADP participant list)
through a biannual letter reporting the latest patient and graft one-year survival outcomes.99
Though the variability of ADP waiting time can be explained to a great extent by factors
also commonly seen in KPD, the prioritization given to IRs is unique to ADP. Given that a
99
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prioritized opportunity is promised to the ID in exchange for her advanced donation, the failure
of the forms to define “prioritized opportunity” is a startling omission that presents two issues for
the participants.
First, the lack of clarity makes it difficult to verify and enforce the efforts on the part of the
KPD registry—in this case, NKR. How will participants know whether, and what sort, of efforts
NKR has made to facilitate the IR’s transplant? Second, it adds one more layer of uncertainty on
top of an already complex process, making it more challenging for a patient to understand her
waiting time and for the registries to manage the patients’ expectations. Misunderstandings of
this sort can lead to negative consequences, such as those illustrated by the Pike incident in
Canada, even when transplant centers have made every effort to procure a transplantable
kidney.103
Clarifying the phrase “prioritized opportunity” is not simple, however. Any promise of a
definitive timeline is unrealistic, for reasons already discussed.104 The matching algorithms of
any KPD program—ADP or other—typically assign some kind of priority weight to each
103
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patient,105 and higher weights are usually assigned to harder-to-match patients to promote
equality in the system.106 So a seemingly obvious clarification might be to assign some
pre-specified priority weights to IRs participating in ADP in the matching algorithm.
The challenge with this approach is that the KPD matching algorithms evolve over time
based on the evolving characteristics of the KPD pool,107 an evolution which is difficult, if not
impossible, to predict and which is outside of the control of any KPD registry or center. The
weights in matching algorithms are often adjusted, and in many cases the weights are not well
documented.108 Therefore, the specification of priorities for ADP participants is not
straightforward. Perhaps, however, the consent process could inform the IR and ID of their
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priority relative to other patients, such as previous donors requiring a transplant, highly
sensitized patients109, and the patients whose scheduled transplants were cancelled due to a donor
renege.
This challenge is further amplified when there is greater temporal separation between the
ID’s donation and the IR’s transplant. To illustrate, in one case, a son wanted to donate for his
mother but was constrained by military leave.110 ADP allowed him to donate and recover prior
to redeployment, and his mother was successfully transplanted 5 months later.111 In cases such
as this, where only a short delay is expected between the ID’s donation and the IR’s expected
transplant date, there is less cause to worry about changing algorithms or deterioration of the
recipient’s health.
In contrast, some ADP IDs might participate in the program in order to gain future
advantage for their IRs, who do not need an immediate transplant, but will likely need one later.
Or, the program may eventually appeal to altruistic donors who want to donate their kidney to a

109

“Highly sensitized” patients are those with high PRA levels. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text.

110
111

Flechner et al., supra note 36.
Id.
41

stranger, but only in exchange for the assurance that, should a loved one ever face renal failure,
transplantation is not thwarted by this lost kidney because the registry has guaranteed priority to
a designated beneficiary. Indeed, it is precisely this type of donor that provides the greatest hope
of increasing the number of living donors and relieving the current organ shortage.113 But cases
like these entail long anticipated waiting times. Managing expectations and clearly
communicating risks to the patient are crucial because so many variables can change in the
interim.
At least two Advanced Donors already fall into this long wait category. Howard
Boardman, a sixty-six year old retired judge, wanted to help his grandson, Quinn, who was born
with a single defective kidney.114 Although Quinn would need a kidney transplant at some point,
Mr. Boardman would be too old to donate when that day arrived. Boardman started a kidney
chain by donating to a stranger in 2014, in exchange for a priority “voucher” that his grandson
could use when he ultimately needed a transplant.115 That date could be years down the road, as
113
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Boardman recognized: “I’ve left a legacy for my grandson,” he said, “I may not even be here
when he realizes it . . . .”116
In another case, a teenage girl had a functioning transplanted kidney.117 But transplanted
kidneys from deceased donors last, on average, for only eight to twelve years, and transplanted
kidneys from living donors last, on average, for only twelve to twenty years,118 meaning that she
would eventually need another transplant. Moreover, because of the prior transplant, she would
be sensitized and thus more difficult to match.119 Her father donated a kidney under ADP, in
exchange for a “gift certificate” granting her priority should she need a second transplant.120
The grandfather to grandson example could be even more complicated if multiple
grandchildren were at risk of renal failure. NKR allows for up to five potential IR’s to be listed,
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stating that, “the first appropriate candidate for transplant will get the ADP kidney.”121 However,
the “first appropriate candidate for transplant” will not always be clear and the factors that will
be used in reaching a determination as to who is the first “appropriate candidate” are not defined.
To illustrate, consider a situation in which multiple beneficiaries have chronic renal insufficiency
(as could be the case if, for example, the kidney problem were genetic). Determining the most
appropriate candidate may involve multiple considerations including the progression and severity
of the disease and the age, diagnosis, and overall health condition of the candidates. For example,
what if one beneficiary is more sick, and thus arguably the “most appropriate” candidate, but is
middle aged? The other beneficiary may be able to last on dialysis longer, but is younger, thus
giving the transplanted kidney a longer useful life. There is currently no indication in the ADP
consent forms of how the “appropriate candidate” issue would be resolved or who has the
authority to resolve it.
Finally, whether the existence of formal contract is acknowledged officially or not, it is
crucial to develop certain contingency plans for when circumstances prevent the participating
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parties from proceeding according to plan. In ADP, the IDs typically donate before the IRs are
matched. Hence some IRs might find themselves no longer eligible for transplant surgery (this
could happen if the health condition of the IR deteriorates), after their IDs have already
undergone donation surgery. The IR consent form states: “I understand that this is
non-transferable, and non-assignable.”122 The ID consent form does not contain such language.
It can be argued that if the IR becomes ineligible for transplant surgery and her ID has donated,
the priority should be transferrable, in which case someone should have the authority to
designate another IR. In any event, the restriction should at least be explicitly included in the ID
consent form, as the ID is the party to whom NKR is contractually obligated. Similar concerns
have been raised,123 and NKR has adjusted its policy to allow an ADP donor to have up to five
intended recipients, mediating this problem somewhat.124 But more clarity is still needed on the
nature of the authority to re-assign priority and the ownership—to the extent it exists—of such
authority, in the event that no named beneficiary is able to utilize the ADP priority. For ADP
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practice to evolve and benefit more people, much effort is needed to prescribe reasonable courses
of action in cases where it becomes challenging for the participants to perform as intended.
V
CONCLUSION
Organ donation has long been regarded as a noble and selfless act. Yet years of organ
shortage suggest that altruistic donation has, so far, been insufficient to meet demand. This
motivates transplant professionals to innovate, both in medical science and in the organization of
transplantation. KPD and its variation, ADP, stand out among such innovations. By participating
in these new systems, instead of passively waiting for a match to be identified by UNOS, renal
failure patients can now influence their fates for the better. But, as a natural byproduct, more
people are involved, and more complicated incentives and more unpredictable outcomes are
introduced.
Analyzing KPD and ADP systems as matching markets—as economists have done for
many years in developing the matching algorithms—helps to highlight this inevitable complexity
and uncertainty. ADP involves multiple parties whose promises of performance are often
separated in time from actual performance. Yet medical professionals have resisted
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(unsuccessfully, as we have detailed) the use of the most common market mechanism for
aligning incentives under such conditions—a contract. Although a set of consent forms are used
to communicate with the donors and recipients, those consent forms are vaguely worded, leaving
much room for interpretation. Moreover, there is limited information in the consent forms
covering contingency situations, making it challenging to manage participant expectation, and
raising the question whether the consent forms are adequate in informing the parties involved.
Transplant professionals—like many non-lawyers—are not fond of the idea of adding
complex legal documents into the transplantation process, fearing it will undermine the
foundation of trust and selflessness on which the transplantation system is built, and might
impede their abilities to adapt to the fast-changing practice in the future. In the case of ADP,
however, this resistance inadvertently created a vague yet binding contract, despite efforts to
“leave the lawyer out of the room.” Although the most likely result of this contract is
low-powered enforcement, there is always the possibility that a court will intervene more
aggressively, interpreting vague terms in a manner that imposes specific obligations on the
parties involved, including NKR.
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As with many other innovations, kidney exchange has great potential in improving social
welfare. At the same time, it is complex and vulnerable to miscommunication and mistrust.
Therefore, clarity and appropriate prescriptive rules of behavior are needed. Though contract is
only one mechanism for achieving that clarity, it is an important one under the circumstances.
Moreover, it is a mechanism the transplant community has already inadvertently embraced.
Having entered the realm of contract, a more careful drafting of that contract only makes sense.
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National Kidney Registry

Intended Recipient's
Government Issued
Photo Identification

Advanced Donation Program
Informed Consent
Intended Recipient
Version 1.7

The Program: The Advanced Donation Program “ADP” allows a medically and psychosocially acceptable Intended Donor “ID” to
donate their kidney via human organ paired donation (more commonly referred to as a swap) before their Intended Recipient “IR” is
scheduled to receive a transplant via a swap. Once the ID donation has occurred, the IR may be activated by their transplant center
for matching within the NKR. The ADP program is unrelated to the U.S. deceased donor system and participation in the ADP
program does not confer any wait time points for the IR in the deceased donor system. When an ADP Donor has multiple Intended
Recipients, the first appropriate candidate for transplant will get the ADP kidney.
Your Situation: I understand that my ID would like to participate in the ADP and donate a kidney to another recipient through the
NKR. This donation gives me a prioritized opportunity to receive a kidney as part of a swap, within the NKR.
Information Release: I consent to the disclosure of all my health, medical, and personal information to the NKR for the purpose of
participating in the ADP. I authorize the NKR to disclose, disseminate and utilize my health, medical and personal information in
conducting the ADP, and I waive any and all privacy law claims that I may or may not have, in the use of this information as part of
the ADP.
My Obligation: I understand that I must keep a copy of this form and present it to my transplant center when I return to receive my
kidney. Additionally, I am willing to undergo the identity verification process when I return to receive my kidney. I understand that
this is non-transferable, and non-assignable.
Patients Risks: There is risk that I may not get transplanted through the ADP due to:
• A sensitization event (e.g. blood transfusion, pregnancy, etc.)
• A situation whereby I become medically unable to go to surgery
• NKR’s inability to find an acceptable compatible donor
• NKR unexpectedly shutting down operations
• Having a blood type of “O” which can often delay a match offer for 1 - 2 years or more after activation
• Being sensitized with a cPRA of 90% or greater which can often delay a match offer for 1 - 2 years or more after activation
• Other unforeseen circumstances such as an act of nature
Intended Recipient Contact Information
Address:
Primary Phone Number:

Email Address:

Secondary Phone Number:

Transplant Center:

Informed Consent Agreed to:

Intended Recipient Identification Information

Name (Print):

Blood Type:

Signature (Sign):

Enter HLA Antigens Below:

Today's Date:
SSN:

A-1

Gender:

A-2

B-1

B-2

DR-1

DR-2

DOB:

Witnessed by:
Name (Print):

Signature (Sign):

Date:

Overnight original signed copy to: National Kidney Registry • 42 Fire Island Avenue • Babylon, NY 11702
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The Program: The Advanced Donation Program “ADP” allows a medically and psychosocially acceptable Intended Donor
“ID” to donate their kidney via human organ paired donation (more commonly referred to as a swap) before their Intended
Recipient “IR” is scheduled to receive a transplant via a swap. Once the ID donation has occurred, the IR may be activated by
their transplant center for matching within the NKR. The ADP program is unrelated to the U.S. deceased donor system and
participation in the ADP program does not confer any wait time points for the IR in the deceased donor system. When an ADP
Donor has multiple Intended Recipients, the first appropriate candidate for transplant will get the ADP kidney.
Your Situation: I would like to participate in the ADP and I am willing to donate a kidney to an NKR patient and understand
that my donation would give my IR a prioritized opportunity to receive a kidney as part of a swap within the NKR.
Information Release: I consent to the disclosure of all my health, medical, and personal information to the NKR for the
purpose of participating in the ADP. I authorize the NKR to disclose, disseminate and utilize my health, medical and personal
information in conducting the ADP, and I waive any and all privacy law claims that I may or may not have, in the use of this
information as part of the ADP.
Risks:
• I may not be able to find a match and donate my kidney through the ADP
• I may become unsuitable for donation at any time in the process
• My surgery may be delayed or cancelled at any time due to unforeseen events
• NKR unexpectedly shutting down operations
• There is no guarantee that my IR will be transplanted through the ADP
Intended Donor Contact Information
Address:
Primary Phone Number:

Email Address:

Secondary Phone Number:

Donor Center:

Informed Consent Agreed to:

Intended Recipient Identification Information

Name (Print):

Name:

Signature (Sign):

DOB:

Today's Date:

SSN:

SSN:

Relationship to IR:

Donor Alias (Assigned by Center):

Intended Recipient Alias:

Witnessed by:
Name (Print):

Signature (Sign):

Date:

Overnight original signed copy to: National Kidney Registry • 42 Fire Island Avenue • Babylon, NY 11702
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